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NO. 52 DECEMBER 2019 Introduction 
Europe’s Third Way in Cyberspace 
What Part Does the New EU Cybersecurity Act Play? 
Annegret Bendiek and Martin Schallbruch 
Cybersecurity has become a key issue for Europe in the global digital transformation. 
The EU Cybersecurity Act lays down a legal framework whose aim is to achieve global 
reach. Embedded in a policy that combines digital sovereignty with strategic inter-
dependence, the Act could represent the gateway to a third European pathway in 
cyberspace, something in between the US model of a liberal market economy and the 
Chinese model of authoritarian state capitalism. The Cybersecurity Act will be a bind-
ing framework for action and provide a tailwind for German cybersecurity policy. 
 
Cyber threats are a component of and, 
at the same time, the spearhead of global 
competition between liberal democracies 
and authoritarian systems. The different 
understanding of cybersecurity and infor-
mation security between Western coun-
tries, on the one hand, and states such as 
China and Russia, on the other, remains a 
key area of conflict in international politics. 
After more than ten years of unsuccessful 
negotiations against a backdrop of growing 
rivalry between the US and China, an agree-
ment on global standards and regulations is 
still a long way off. The EU is trying to find 
a third way which circumvents this rivalry. 
This has become apparent in, among other 
things, the 5G debate. The Commission is 
inclined to allow the Chinese company, 
Huawei, to be involved in building Euro-
pean 5G infrastructure, subject to tight 
controls and only if all market participants 
meet strict hardware and software certifi-
cation criteria. The question of the trust-
worthiness of Chinese telecommunications 
components is being shelved in favour of 
a market regulation solution. With its 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
which Member States have been required 
to apply since May 2018, and its consistent 
approach to competition policy, the EU has 
taken on an effective and globally respected 
role as a regulatory power, achieving a 
balance between consumer protection and 
the competitiveness of the industry. The 
EU Cybersecurity Act further strengthens 
Europe’s regulatory power. However, the 
European cybersecurity certificate, defined 
with the entry into force of the Act in June 
2019, will only be able to develop into a 
global model if it is flanked by a European 
strategy for the digital space. Regulation, 
competition and industrial policy, as well 
as support for innovation must relate to 
security and cyber foreign policy. The key 
question will be whether and how the EU 
can successfully strengthen European digi-
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tal sovereignty whilst preserving its liberal 
democratic traditions in the digital space 
and ensure the necessary strategic interde-
pendence with other regions of the world. 
Cybersecurity at the heart of 
global conflicts 
The relevance of the current conflicts be-
tween the US, China and the EU goes far 
beyond trade and investment policy issues. 
They are so contentious because digital 
technologies form the communicative 
infrastructure of highly developed infor-
mation societies. Those who control the 
hardware and software also determine 
which innovations and business models 
are possible and who has access to what 
information. There is increasing coopera-
tion between private technology companies 
and institutions that perform tasks of state 
responsibility, such as protecting critical 
infrastructure. This trend can be seen both 
in the EU and in the US, but much more so 
in China and Russia, whose governments 
regard cybersecurity to an even greater 
extent as the cornerstone of their striving 
for state control over cyberspace. The EU no 
longer treats companies working in China 
and Russia to expand social surveillance or 
cooperating with the NSA in the USA merely 
as an apolitical, market-economy actor. 
Conflict of values 
Since Edward Snowden’s revelations and 
the use of digital technologies for state sur-
veillance, the aspiration that the Internet 
will promote freedom and human rights 
everywhere is no longer completely plau-
sible. It is evident that today’s Internet is 
a space in which conflicts of values and 
distributional conflicts occur and future 
modalities of individual and social self-
determination are negotiated. The tech-
nology of the network infrastructure and 
its associated applications are not value-
neutral instruments, instead they are im-
pacting on decisions and actions. They are 
instruments of value-related policies, as the 
dispute over Chinese technology company, 
Huawei, shows. The US administration 
views Huawei not only as a market partici-
pant but, at the same time, as a Trojan 
horse from an unfriendly government. Bei-
jing refutes these allegations and considers 
the exclusion of Huawei from the US mar-
ket as a measure directed against China’s 
position in the global market as a whole. 
The conflict over Huawei marks a break 
with the purely market-based logic of global 
trade relations and expedites a growing 
digital mercantilism. Many see converging 
markets as no longer simply an opportunity 
to improve prosperity, but also as a danger 
to self-determination and public safety. 
They argue that digital products are suit-
able for undermining value systems and 
subverting governmental control through 
technical backdoors. Terms such as “tech-
nological sovereignty” and “economic vul-
nerability” or “weaponized interdepend-
ence” are an indication and legitimation of 
the growing willingness to restrict innova-
tion and competition when it comes to 
digital products and services. However, new 
confrontations in the digital world are not 
limited to the relationship between the 
West and China. Conflicting values that are 
difficult to reconcile exist even today in 
transatlantic relations. The much vaunted 
transatlantic community of shared values 
reaches its limits where the idea of a free 
(digital) single market clashes with the re-
quirement to protect personal data and 
informational self-determination, and with 
European competition law. The long-ignored 
dominance of US Internet companies has 
forced Europe to embark on a course of 
digital self-assertiveness – from data pro-
tection and competition law to taxation. 
Cybersecurity conflict 
Cyber attacks and defence are seriously 
challenging state sovereignty. While the 
complexity and interdependence of digital 
systems are rapidly increasing, the safety 
quality of the hardware and software used 
for these systems remains underdeveloped 
and lacks the necessary human resources to 
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secure them. Cyberspace is constantly cre-
ating new attack vectors and targets. The 
criminal exploitation of vulnerabilities, 
such as the use of ransomware to blackmail 
companies, and state cyber attacks aimed 
at eliciting information or causing destabili-
sation, or as part of hybrid warfare, are 
mutually reinforcing. The most extreme 
example is North Korea which generates 
global revenue from global cyber opera-
tions for the procurement of missile tech-
nology. In five rounds of negotiations at 
UN level, a Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGEs) has been debating the international 
condemnation of and/or the placing of 
restrictions on cyber attacks and setting up 
a cyber defence organisation under inter-
national law – but without success. No 
short-term progress can be expected from 
the current sixth round of the GGE, nor 
from parallel negotiations initiated by 
Russia being conducted in an Open Ended 
Working Group (OEWG). 
Trade conflict 
The trade dispute between the US and 
China is essentially entangled with the 
development of markets in goods and 
services towards a greater emphasis on 
digital products and services. The digital 
transformation of global markets is not 
only accompanied by a growing economic 
interdependence, it has also increasingly 
reduced the ability of individual countries 
to control them. When US President Trump 
announces trade restrictions, he intends to 
regain control over the innovation-driven 
global competition the US is confronted 
with. At the same time, the products and 
services offered by US tech companies are 
an essential tool of state control and in-
fluence for Washington. However, complex 
digital systems such as 5G network tech-
nology could prove to be an almost un-
controllable technology that has been built 
into a state’s infrastructure for decades 
and is ultimately under the control of an 
authoritarian state. Network products are 
currently evolving the software-based tech-
nology. The regular updates required for 
software bring functional improvements 
that the operator using it hardly notices. At 
the same time, the digital transformation is 
affecting all market segments, from agricul-
tural products to medical technology and 
mechanical engineering. Trade issues mat-
ter for digital sovereignty and vice versa. 
The EU as a regulatory power 
In order to assert regulatory power in this 
conflict-prone world without borders, it 
has committed itself to a very specific path 
that is fundamentally different from both 
Silicon Valley’s libertarian regulatory style 
and China’s authoritarian model. Europe’s 
regulatory power is based on the European 
Treaties and on the premise that individual 
freedom and social responsibility (Article 2 
TEU) are equally important. Democratic 
decision-making is based on the rule of law 
and the market participant is involved as a 
regulatory addressee in formulating and im-
plementing legal acts within EU comitology. 
In Articles 3 and 10 of the TEU, the EU em-
phasises the individual self-determination 
of Europe’s citizens with its commitment 
to market freedoms and democracy. It in-
volves various stakeholders and market par-
ticipants in formal and informal EU pro-
cedures, where they take a position, for 
example, on fundamental ethical issues. 
In recent years, the Council of Europe, the 
European Council, the European Parlia-
ment and the Commission have formulated 
a set of principles which reflect the idea of 
a digital society centred on the individual 
and the common good, at the same time. 
New technologies must, therefore, also be 
judged by whether they are conducive to 
democracy and whether their use respects 
human rights. Regulatory measures can 
make a decisive contribution to balancing 
the opportunities and risks of a technology 
with the interests of companies, consumers, 
the state and civil society. One impressive 
example of this regulatory approach is the 
EU Communication on Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI). AI is not understood as an end in 
itself but as “a tool operating in the service 
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of humanity and the public good”. The 
final report from an expert group set up 
by the Commission and published in April 
2019 stresses the need to preserve human 
autonomy in the use of AI, to avoid harm-
ing people and to generally respect the 
principles of fairness and comprehensibil-
ity. Despite the general European consensus 
on the need for market freedom, data pro-
tection and security to be closely linked and 
balanced in regulatory terms, there is still 
little agreement on how national security 
standards can be reconciled with the EU’s 
liberal market logic. This lack of agreement 
is particularly evident in the way it has 
dealt with the Chinese company Huawei. 
Data protection and data security 
as an EU interest 
The specifically European approach to 
digitisation can be found in the EU’s legis-
lative acts on data protection and data 
security. The General Data Protection Regu-
lation, which has been in force for all com-
panies since May 2018, sets new standards 
in the task of finding a balance between 
protecting personal data and ensuring the 
free movement of data in the Single Market. 
Data protection and cybersecurity have so 
far been considered separately. However, 
the two topics are increasingly merging into 
one. This can be seen, for instance, in digi-
tal energy meters (SmartMeter). Not only are 
they subject to the highest levels of safety 
and security standards, they also have the 
highest data protection requirements in 
order to ensure that third parties do not 
gain illegal access to data about users’ do-
mestic habits. By establishing a comprehen-
sive system of defining and certifying tech-
nical cyber security, the EU is taking a 
major step towards further consolidating its 
role as a regulatory power, which it played 
so successfully with the GDPR. 
The Cybersecurity Act 
On 10 December 2018, the European Parlia-
ment, the European Council and the Euro-
pean Commission agreed on the policy 
terms of a Cybersecurity Act. The Regula-
tion on ENISA (the European Union Agency 
for Cybersecurity) and on information and 
communications technology cybersecurity 
certification (Cybersecurity Act) entered into 
force in June 2019. The Act contained two 
major reforms: The EU cybersecurity agency 
(European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security, ENISA) will have a 
mandate beyond 2020 to assist Member 
States in dealing with cyber attacks. It intro-
duces a cybersecurity certification frame-
work for ICT products, services and pro-
cesses (European certification framework). 
Certification is based on the idea that stand-
ards and norms can create a balance 
between the need for consumer protection 
and the industry’s legitimate claim to com-
petitiveness. Both are high European prin-
ciples that need reconciling with one 
another. Consumer protection means pro-
tecting consumers from negative conse-
quences, such as unauthorised disclosure 
or use of their data, and generally providing 
them with reliable and high-quality prod-
ucts. However, these objectives may conflict 
with the competitiveness of some providers. 
For example, companies often view high 
standards of privacy and data security as 
barriers to competition. 
The Cybersecurity Act provides for a vol-
untary “conformity assessment” of informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) 
products, i.e. an EU-wide European certifi-
cation framework for the cybersecurity of 
products, services and processes. The pro-
cedure for setting minimum standards and 
reviewing them has already been estab-
lished in the regulations on general product 
safety. In this respect, the Regulation 
focuses on harmonising safety standards. 
The relevant national body should be able 
to verify that they comply with the estab-
lished cybersecurity features of ICT prod-
ucts, services and processes. In order for a 
product category to be deemed compliant 
it must meet a series of review criteria, 
referred to in the Regulation as a “European 
cybersecurity certification scheme”. The 
European Commission, representatives of 
the Member States and stakeholders shall 
 SWP Comment 52 
 December 2019 
 5 
jointly determine the products for which 
such schemes are to be drawn up. ENISA 
shall prepare drafts for the schemes. As 
soon as European schemes for the product 
groups have been adopted, they will replace 
any national schemes. 
ENISA will also specify assurance levels 
for ICT products and services. A European 
cybersecurity certification scheme may 
specify one or more assurance levels for ICT 
products and ICT services. In future, there 
will be three assurance levels: “basic”, “sub-
stantial” or “high”, depending on how re-
silient the products and services are against 
cyber attacks and the degree of trust that 
can be guaranteed to them. Manufacturers 
are free to decide whether or not to certify 
a product according to an existing scheme. 
Depending on the desired assurance level, 
certification can be implemented by an 
independent assessment body or take the 
form of a manufacturer’s declaration. The 
aim is to boost confidence in company ICT 
products through the implementation of 
various measures that are part of the certifi-
cation process. Consequently, manufacturers 
must: 
∎ select secure default settings for their 
products; 
∎ provide end users with the tools to use 
their products in a safe and secure 
manner; 
∎ disclose security vulnerabilities; 
∎ inform end customers when support for 
an individually issued security guarantee 
ends. 
Finally, ENISA will maintain and make 
publicly available checklists to pre-assess 
the cyber risk of each ICT product and 
service. It will also keep and continuously 
update a list of ICT products and services 
for which it considers cybersecurity certifi-
cation to be a necessity (priority list). 
The European cybersecurity certificate 
scheme will acquire global relevance due 
to the sheer size of the European market. In 
addition, two complementary mechanisms 
ensure that adoption of the certification 
schemes will occur more swiftly under the 
Cybersecurity Regulation. In its IT security 
legislation on critical infrastructures and 
digital services (NIS Directive), the EU re-
quires operators of such services to take 
“state-of-the-art” IT security measures. The 
operators themselves are responsible for 
meeting this undefined legal requirement. 
The use of certified products will make it 
easier for them to prove they have aligned 
themselves with the state of the art. In addi-
tion, the Regulation limits the voluntary 
nature of certification by explicitly stating 
that EU law will require certification from 
another body, for example one in the rele-
vant sector. It is likely that the Commission 
and Parliament will make use of this invita-
tion to ensure that new technical applica-
tions comply with cybersecurity require-
ments. 
The effectiveness of the new European 
cybersecurity certification will largely 
depend on the EU’s approach to developing 
these schemes. Some of the Commission’s 
statements suggest that it regards Internet 
of Things (IoT) products in the consumer 
market as a priority. Elsewhere, it advocates 
applying certification schemes in the field 
of industrial applications. Current certifica-
tion schemes in the high security sector, 
which are mainly used for government 
applications, are to be transferred to the 
European system. 
Germany is also expected to bring in 
national legislation to broaden certification. 
For example, the draft IT Security Act 2.0 
includes a new system category for “Critical 
Infrastructure Core Components”. It refers 
to IT systems that are of particular impor-
tance for the functioning of critical infra-
structure. Certification should certainly 
become obligatory for such systems. The 
Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur), 
together with the Federal Office for Infor-
mation Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in 
der Informationstechnik, BSI), intends to make 
initial use of the new provisions – in ac-
cordance with the recently introduced 
safety catalogue – to mandate the certifi-
cation of the core components of telecom-
munications networks. This move is a direct 
consequence of the debate over the lack of 
trust in Huawei products for 5G networks. 
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How might the strategy for a 
third way be designed? 
As digital markets start to merge, different 
types of regulatory models have evolved 
globally. The Western model for liberal and 
open societies is increasingly interoperable 
with the Chinese model, which is similar 
to ones used in Russia, Iran and some Arab 
states, representing an authoritarian regi-
mentation of the digital space with an 
equal claim to legitimacy on a global scale. 
Some EU Member States are already trying 
to pursue illiberal development paths. 
Given the conflicts described above, the 
burning questions are: what is the most 
appropriate stance to take in dealing with 
the digital space in other regions of the 
world? Should Europe stick to a consistent 
policy of digital sovereignty on this issue? 
Should it subsequently develop its own 
6G mobile data networks with the aid of 
national funding programmes, its own 
Google, its own WhatsApp and so on? As 
convincing as this idea may initially sound, 
the long-term consequences of a desire for 
digital strategic autonomy may be fraught 
with risk – both in terms of innovation 
policy and security policy. 
Digital sovereignty and... 
The term digital sovereignty refers to the 
ability of a subject of international law to 
control and regulate cyberspace. The EU’s 
certification schemes and data protection 
rules are instruments for exercising digital 
sovereignty, signalling that the Union 
reserves the right to determine how digital 
products and services are designed and used 
based on its constitutional principles and a 
democratically legitimate balance of inter-
ests among market participants. This re-
quirement, derived from the internal mar-
ket principle, applies for as long as the EU’s 
regulatory power continues to have a real 
impact and where corresponding products 
and services are available. Nevertheless, 
crash barriers alone do not produce road-
worthy vehicles. Exercising digital sover-
eignty should also include promoting the 
European economy’s capability and, above 
all, its innovation policy in such a way that 
it can develop appropriate solutions. Key 
to this are (1) maintaining and enhancing 
global competitiveness, (2) rules on com-
petition that are as fair as possible (3) in-
vestment in digital infrastructures. The EU 
has its own set of values and good reasons 
for placing them at the heart of its internal 
market policy. It demonstrates its digital 
sovereignty by incorporating these values 
into its Regulations on digital products and 
how they are used, as well as in controlling 
and implementing innovations. 
However, heading towards this model of 
digital sovereignty threatens to revive old 
patterns of confrontation because the con-
cept is centred around risk prevention, 
territorial defence and protectionism. In an 
effort to be less vulnerable to external risks 
and threats, Europe should not make the 
mistake of promoting exactly what it in-
tends to prevent. The means of choice for 
the EU must be measures that build trust 
and security based on its own assessment 
and control capabilities, and not protection-
ism. Against this background, an appropri-
ate objective would be to combine digital 
sovereignty with strategic interdependence. 
... strategic interdependence 
Strategic interdependence is a strategy that 
recognises that, in the context of globalisa-
tion and digitisation, the reliance on resource 
security, production chains and market open-
ness are only a few drivers of complexity. In 
this perspective, security is not achieved by 
political self-reference, but as the result of 
a process of economic and political integra-
tion and increasing interdependence by 
default. Cooperative interface management, 
such as mutually recognising product safety 
certifications, replaces confrontational 
boundaries. European integration is the 
best example of how interdependence has 
brought peace and stability to Europe. 
There are those who call this European 
approach naïve and fear that the EU’s high 
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standards in data protection and data secu-
rity will put it at a competitive disadvant-
ages and that the EU will fall even further 
behind the US and China. They suggest 
that consumers are not prepared to pay for 
higher standards. As was the case with data 
protection, the problem of the relevance 
and enforceability of European guidelines 
also rears its ugly head with cybersecurity: 
Does Europe first have to become a global 
technology leader in order to be able to 
afford ambitious local standards? A closer 
look at the argument quickly reveals that 
its premises are implausible. According to 
the first assumption, Europe is not in a 
position to set its own standards since 
standards are not set in the Single Market, 
but in the world market. However, accord-
ing to the second assumption, in this case 
the US and China would dominate for as 
long as they develop better performing 
products. This supremacy of performance 
is further cemented, according to the third 
assumption, in that consumers are un-
willing to recognise ethical standards as 
performance features and pay more for 
them accordingly. 
However, none of the three assumptions 
holds up under closer scrutiny. The General 
Data Protection Regulation has clearly 
shown that Europe is in a position to in-
dependently set demanding standards and 
to ensure they are applied throughout 
Europe. European standards even have an 
impact far beyond the EU. Japan aligns it-
self with European law, as does India and, 
from 2020, so will Brazil. For many globally 
active corporations it makes more sense to 
apply the demanding EU regulations every-
where than to operate with different stand-
ards in different markets. Facebook is now 
calling for global regulation modelled on 
the GDPR. European standards also have 
good prospects in third markets outside 
Europe (and outside the US, China and 
Russia). Ultimately, the same logic observed 
in EU product regulation also applies to 
global product regulation. The “Brussels 
effect” ensures that high standards displace 
low standards when they are legally bind-
ing in relevant submarkets. This also fal-
sifies the third assumption that consumers 
are not prepared to pay for high ethical 
standards. The high quality of European 
standards and their mutual recognition, 
from machine safety to food purity, is an 
integral part of the success story of Euro-
pean integration and a key competitive 
advantage over other regions. There is no 
reason to assume that this logic cannot be 
applied to digital products and cybersecurity, 
and perhaps in the future to components 
of artificial intelligence as well. 
Europe’s digital sovereignty can be rec-
onciled with the structural openness and 
global connectivity of the digital single mar-
ket if these goods are strategically linked 
with one another: 
1. Europe should define core areas of 
digital technology and infrastructure that 
require assessment and accountability. For 
example, network technology and cloud 
services must certainly be trustworthy. 
2. The uptake of European cybersecurity 
certification in these areas needs to be swift 
and consistent. It needs to get a political 
agenda. Germany could press ahead with 
this during its forthcoming Council Presi-
dency. 
3. System interoperability and platform 
openness must become the fundamental 
principles of European digital services and 
infrastructures. Even greater attention 
should be paid to these principles in up-
coming national and European regulatory 
projects in the digital sector. 
4. European infrastructure investments 
need to be channelled into services with the 
corresponding European certification. This 
applies equally to energy networks, digital 
mobility and healthcare. 
5. The ability to assess and control the 
work of foreign technologies in defined 
core areas must be regularly reviewed. The 
corresponding approvals should be granted 
for a limited time period. As with 5G, Euro-
pean Risk Assessments should also be devel-
oped for other technology areas. 
6. Cyber foreign policy should be mas-
sively intensified in order to gradually ease 
current concerns through bilateral and 
multilateral security and confidence-build- 
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ing measures based on the principle of 
reciprocity. Insights into the trustworthi-
ness of manufacturers – such as in 5G – 
need to be politically assessed and agreed 
at EU level. Doubts cannot be eliminated 
through the technology. 
Dr Annegret Bendiek is a Senior Associate in the EU / Europe Research Division. 
Martin Schallbruch is Deputy Director of the Digital Society Institute at the ESMT Berlin. 
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